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Abstract:
Object o f this paper is to examine the options for monetary integration In the Andean Community, 
in the context of existing literature on the subject. After a survey of the relevant literature, some ; 
stylised facts of the Andean Community are examined. Optimum Currency Area criteria are con-/ 
sidered, as are some indictors of fear of floating and dollarization within the region. I argue that 
the traditional literature on monetary integration has been developed largely with the intent of 
explaining integration in Europe, and to consider instead monetary integration In Latin America 
we need a new framework, one that takes into account the particular characteristics of these 
economies: fear of floating, original sin, dollarization, and large and volatile capital flows, subject 
to financial contagion and sudden stops. In conclusion I examine the pros and cons of three pos­
sible options available to the Andean Community: mutual exchange rate pegging, a common re­
gional currency and dollarization.
Key words: Monetary alternatives, integration, Andean Community of Nations, exchange re­
gimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently one of the Andean Community's most ambitious commitments is 
that of form ing a common market by 2005. This would imply not only the free 
movement of goods and services, but also of labor and capital within the region. 
The achievem ent of this project will require harmonization of national policies in 
such areas as investment, taxation, intellectual property rights and m acroeco­
nomic coordination. Furthermore, it will call for further infrastructure and border 
development and other actions complementary to the integration process, such 
as the developm ent of sectoral policies for agriculture and transportation. While a 
common m arket does not have direct implications for member countries’ ex­
change rate policies, the coordination -  or lack of - such policies across countries 
necessarily will affect the free movement of capital, i.e. the process of financial 
integration. Furthermore, the exchange rate issue becomes crucial if the common
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market is considered not an objective p e r se  but as a step -  albeit a very impor­
tant one -  in a process of ever stronger regional integration.
While the prospect of monetary integration in the Andean Community is not 
yet on the agenda, Ecuador’s decision to dollarize has ignited a debate over the 
optimal direction for exchange rates within the region. The questions that must 
be dealt with are the following:
Is integration possible without some sort of coordination of member coun­
tries’ exchange rate regimes?
In particular, is it possible to continue the integration process when member 
states have extremely different exchange rate regimes, ranging from free 
floats to dollarization?
Is monetary integration, and ultimately the formation of a monetary union, 
imperative and inevitable for successful regional integration?
Given the track record of many Latin American nations, could dollarization 
instead be the answer, providing stability and credibility and allowing greater 
participation of the region in the global economy?
Extending this last point, might dollarization not be the answer for the entire 
Latin American region, in the context of the development of the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas?
Regional agreements have become increasingly popular in recent years, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) reports that currently more than 150 such 
agreements are in force, most of which have been concluded over the past 10 
years. Nearly all countries participate in at least one. Academics and policymak­
ers have not yet reached a consensus over the impact of regional groupings on 
world trade, and on whether they constitute an aid or an obstacle to global trade 
liberalization. A further development has been an increased interest in deep  inte­
gration: integration that goes beyond the liberalization of trade between member 
countries to encompass the harmonization and integration of other economic 
policies. The rationale for deeper integration can be both economic and political. 
One motivation is tied to the vision that the world is splitting up into three major 
regional blocs: the European Union (EU), an American bloc tied to the U.S. and 
an Asian one led by Japan. If this is in fact the direction towards which the world 
is moving, belonging to a regional group is fundamental to have any voice in 
international negotiations. Furthermore, the greater the level of integration and 
cohesion within a group the greater bargaining power, all else equal.
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Apart from the more general considerations on regionalism, there has been 
much debate over the efficacy of so-called “South-South” agreements (i.e. where 
all members are developing countries), as opposed to “North-South” ones, where 
at least one member is an industrialized country. Recent research1 has stressed 
that for South-South integration to be successful it must imply deep integration. 
Merely liberalizing trade among developing partners tends to imply static costs 
that outweigh the benefits. In fact “South-South” agreements are more likely to 
entail trade diversion, i.e. the diversion of trade from more efficient exporters 
outside the region to less efficient regional producers. This may be due both to 
underdevelopment of some Southern industries and to high outside tariffs that 
generally accom pany the liberalization process in these countries. Regional inte­
gration can imply positive scale and competition effects, but the exploitation of 
these positive dynam ic effects often require the harmonization of other economic 
policies and the liberalization of factor movements. While it is possible that these 
benefits could be obtained through unilateral liberalization as well, politically it 
may be easier to do so first regionally. Furthermore, it is important to not overlook 
the purely political reasons for the formation of regional agreements, such as 
increasing security, insuring democracy and improving visibility and bargaining 
power in the world arena. Such benefits are more likely to be achieved the dee­
per the degree of integration.
W hat does this imply for Latin America, and the Andean region in particular? 
For regionalism to be successful, it must go hand in hand with liberalization to­
wards the rest o f the world. Furthermore, it must entail deep integration: focus 
should be not be limited to inter-regional trade liberalization, but towards greater 
harmonization and integration of other economic policies as well. W ithin this con­
text falls the issue of monetary integration in the Andean region: If we accept that 
deep integration is needed for the success of the region, what is the role to be 
played by regional exchange rates?
While the formation of the European Union has produced an extensive litera­
ture on monetary unions, the recent financial crises in various emerging markets 
have produced a literature more specific to the economic situations of Latin Am e­
rican nations. The focus of this newer literature may appear unrelated to moneta­
ry integration, however issues such as fear of floating, dollarization and original 
sin are such an integral part of Latin American economics that they cannot be 
ignored. Indeed, a theory of monetary integration that does not include such is­
sues would be incomplete. We will consider both the traditional literature and
1 See World Bank Report on Trade Blocs, 2000.
and newer theoretical developments to examine the different options available to 
the Andean countries.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: THE PRE-CRISIS DEBATE
a. O ptim um  C urrency A reas
The traditional starting point for discussing issues concerning monetary inte­
gration is the optimum currency area (OCA) approach, first developed by Mundell 
(1961) and further elaborated by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969).2 The basic 
concept is best understood by looking at an extremely simple example, taken 
from Krugman (1990), where the proposed currency area - Europe - consists of 
only two countries, France and Germany. Comparative advantage between the 
two countries determines trade, such that France exports cheese and Germany 
sausage. The world market is subject to stochastic shocks that can shift the rela­
tive demand of these goods.
Suppose France and Germany have already formed a regional agreement 
that entails the free movement of goods, and possibly that of labor and capital as 
well. Should the two countries maintain separate currencies? If so, which would 
be preferable, fixed or floating exchange rates?
The classic case for allowing the exchange rate to float, which dates back to 
Friedman (1953), is that floating rates ease the adjustment process in the case of 
shocks. In our example, consider an external shock that causes the world relative 
demand for French cheese to fall. To absorb this shock, it will be necessary for 
the relative price of French cheese to fall as well. This can be achieved either 
through some combination of deflation in France and inflation in Germany, or via 
a devaluation of the French franc against the German Deutsche mark. This sec­
ond route proves much easier, especially if prices and wages are sticky, in fact in 
this case the first route would imply a French recession.
What instead are the disadvantages to floating? The answer is mostly micro- 
economic. Floating exchange rates imply uncertainty, and for econom ic agents, 
especially risk adverse ones, it is costly to operate in such an environment. In 
particular, these costs will be larger if the market is speculatively inefficient so as
2 M u n d e ll's  fu n d a m e n ta l co n trib u tio n  to open  e co n o m y  m a c ro e co n o m ics  la te r w o n  h im  the 
N obe l P rize.
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to produce excess volatility (certainly an issue in the Andean region!). Therefore 
a fixed exchange rate system provides the following benefits: 1) a reduction in 
the costs of econom ic calculation for agents, 2) the reduction of uncertainty and 
exchange rate risk, 3) the elimination of transaction costs tied to the need to 
hedge against exchange rate risk, and 4) the elimination of transaction costs of 
exchanging different currencies.
It m ight seem that one could achieve the benefits of a floating rate with a cur­
rency union (but w ithout a common currency), where the exchange rate between 
the two countries is fixed but can be adjusted when necessary. The risk of such a 
system is that it is subject to speculative attacks whenever market operators 
think that an exchange rate readjustment might be on the horizon. This puts the 
central banks in a difficult situation: to limit attacks the central banks must be 
credible in their commitment to enforce the fixed rate, but retaining credibility will 
inhibit their ability to make adjustments to absorb shocks. This entails that in 
general an adjustable peg system will be less effective than a floating one at 
absorbing shocks and smoothing out the macroeconomic adjustment process.
As we see, both fixed and the flexible rates offer costs and benefits, and 
some sort of cost-benefit analysis must be developed to determine the optimal 
regime. In other words, we must weigh the benefit of being able to easily adjust 
relative prices against the gains from decreased uncertainty and volatility in mar­
ket operations. The optimal currency area approach makes the argument that the 
more closely linked the two economies, the more likely that fixed exchange rates 
be the optimal regime. Consider the following graph, taken from Krugman (1990), 
where the horizontal axis represents trade between the two countries as a share 
of total GNP, and vertical axis represents costs and benefits as a percentage of 
GNP. The two curves represent the benefits and costs of a fixed regime relative 
to a flexible one. The crossing point determines the critical level of integration, 
i.e. for trade above T* fixed exchange rates are preferable to floating.
The benefits curve slopes upwards for the following reason: if fixed exchange 
rates entail decreased uncertainty, the benefits to market operators will increase 
the greater the size of the relevant market, i.e. the greater the amount of trade 
between the two countries. While the sign of this effect is straightforward, quan­
tifying it can prove much more complicated.





The cost curve slopes downwards firstly because of a scale effect: the size of 
a price adjustment necessary to accommodate an external shock will be smaller 
the larger the initial trade between the two regions. Consider again our example 
of decreased world demand for French cheese, accompanied by a rise in the 
demand for German sausage. Suppose this causes the French trade balance 
towards the rest of the world to worsen by 1 percent of GDP, and the German 
trade balance to improve by 1 percent. To offset this shock, France needs to 
improve its trade balance with Germany by 1 percent, in a fixed exchange rate 
regime this must occur through decreased French prices and wages so as to 
increase French competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany, However the required fall in 
French prices will be sm aller, the greater French exports to Germany. In other 
words, the greater the amount of pre-shock trade between the two countries, the 
greater the margin of maneuver for France.
A second reason for the downward slope is more implicit, and lies in the ef­
fect large scale trade has on the price adjustment process itself. If France is tra­
ding extensively with Germany, it is possible that French prices are implicitly or 
explicitly indexed to the DM, so exchange rate adjustment would be ineffective 
anyway. In other words, French devaluation would only succeed in increasing 
inflation.
M undell’s analysis also suggests that fixed exchange rates or a monetary 
union will be more appropriate the more symmetric the nature of economic
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shocks across m ember countries or, in the absence of the former, in the presen­
ce of high labor mobility and price and wage flexibility. Labor mobility lowers the 
costs of fixed exchange rates not only inside and but outside of the regional area 
as well. If labor is allowed to move freely between France and Germany, the 
shock to relative price will cause labor to migrate from France to Germany until 
wages have stabilized and unemployment has been absorbed. This would redu­
ce the need of any type of wage adjustment, lowering the costs of the adjustment 
process.
Kenen (1969) highlights the importance of trade based on competitive rather 
than comparative advantage: the more members specialize in the production of a 
diverse mix of goods, the greater the likelihood that external shocks be asymm e­
tric. Furthermore, in the case of intra-industry trade large changes in the real 
exchange rate would quickly affect profitability and performance of affected pro­
ducers, with negative effects on investment and growth in the affected sectors, 
that could ultimately lead to protectionist pressures. Therefore the importance of 
member countries producing a relatively sim ilar mix of goods. Later researchers 
have identified additional criteria, such as capital mobility and a common tax and 
transfer system. On the other hand, the costs o f fixed exchange rates and the 
associated loss of monetary autonomy will be greater 1) the more asymmetric 
(i.e. the more region or country specific) are macroeconomic shocks, 2) the more 
powerful the instrument of monetary policy, and 3) when other adjustment me­
chanisms such as relative wages and labor mobility are less effective.
In conclusion, policymakers have summarized preceding literature in the fo ­
llowing list of criteria for a group of countries to be considered an optimum cu­
rrency area:
symmetric shocks across members;
labor mobility;
price and wage flexibility;
and the existence of a supernational mechanism for fiscal redistribution.
The first is the most important, the latter three conditions serve to m inimize 
costs of adjustment in the case the currency area were subjected to asymmetric 
shocks. Symmetry of shocks can be evaluated by considering a variety of eco­
nomic indicators, such as correlation of growth rates, the degree of intraregional 
trade, sim ilarities in the composition of trade, among others.
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£>. C red ib ility  and exchange rate regim es
“ Increasing credibility” is an argument often touted for monetary integration. 
In particular, it is argued that monetary integration allows “weaker” members to 
free ride off the greater monetary and exchange rate credibility of their stronger 
partners. But what if none of the member countries have particularly credible 
Central Banks? And would this argument be stronger or weaker under a common 
currency?
The literature on the credibility argument for monetary unions is tied to an ex­
tensive literature on the role of credibility in monetary policy. The seminal paper 
on credibility is Kydland and Prescott (1977), considered the stepping stone for all 
subsequent literature on the topic. Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1993) examine the issue of credibility from the point of view of countries 
looking to form a monetary union, applied in particular to the European case.
Monetary unification has the benefit of providing a device through which high 
inflation countries can free ride off the credibility of their lower inflation partners. 
In the case of Europe, and especially in the case of the now defunct European 
Monetary System, it was generally believed that the arrangement was a way for 
France and Italy to purchase a commitment to low inflation at the cost of accep­
ting German monetary policy.
At first glance, it would appear that a country with higher than average infla­
tion would not wish to join a monetary union because the arrangement would 
cause it to lose competitiveness relative to its partners with lower inflation. In fact, 
excess inflation combined with fixed exchange rates results in a one-for-one ap­
preciation of the real exchange rate. However the possibility to latch on to the 
credibility of a stronger central bank’s commitment to low inflation may be suffi­
cient reason for the high inflation country to join.
The argument behind this statement hinges on the relationship between infla­
tion, the expected rate of inflation, and unemployment. Suppose each central 
bank is able to choose its inflation rate, given an expected rate of inflation that is 
already built into wage contracts. Employment depends on the deviation of actual 
from expected inflation. The countries where inflation is highest are usually those 
with the highest incentive to use inflation surprises as tools of monetary policy, 
this will occur when the response of output and employment to unanticipated 
inflation is high and when the government has a large amount of outstanding 
nominal liabilities. However given that economic agents are rational the govern­
ment cannot systematically use surprise shocks. The result will be that both ex­
pected and actual inflation will be higher than the rate that would prevail if 
policymakers could credibly precommit.
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Another disadvantage of floating exchange rates has to do with coordination. 
Countries with floating exchange rates have an incentive to engage in beggar- 
thy-neighbor devaluation: devaluating increases competitiveness, but at the ex­
pense of the competitiveness of one’s trading partners. If all countries do this, all 
will end up with high inflation and no competitivity gains. Fixed rates elim inate the 
problem by imposing the need to coordinate monetary policies.
Fixing the exchange rate can thus be seen as a way of changing the incenti­
ves of the monetary authority and eliminating part of the inefficiency tied to the 
monetary authorities’ lack of credibility. It is important to note that this argument 
gives a system an implicitly asymmetric nature. The credibility argument suppo­
ses that the benefit o f fixing the exchange rate comes from borrowing credibility 
from a partner country, so the stability of the system depends fundam entally of 
the stability of the “strongest” partner. This eventually can lead to trouble, in fact 
one o f the reasons the Bretton Woods system fell apart was that the US faltered 
in its role of global monetary leader.
While this line of reasoning m ight hold for fixed exchange rate, would the 
credibility argument be stronger or weaker in the case of monetary integration 
with a common currency? The answer is not clear-cut. On the one hand, a com ­
mon currency imposes a more credible commitment: the commitment to fixed 
rates is always in some way provisional as long as monetary authorities control 
their own national currencies, and there is always the possibility of leaving a fixed 
rate arrangement (as in fact happened in Europe in 1993). Reintroducing a na­
tional currency after a common currency has been adopted is much more costly, 
from both an economical and a political point of view. On the other hand, one 
might argue that common currency is less credible as an anti-inflationary device. 
While in a fixed exchange rate system high inflation countries implicitly follow the 
m onetary policies of the stronger partner, a monetary union would entail the fo r­
mation of a regional central bank where all nations would necessarily be repre­
sented. This might in fact give rise to an outcome with higher inflation than before 
integration.
c. The European Example
“A single currency is the cement that binds our economies together” - Sir 
Leon Brittan.
“By the end o f the century, Europe will have a single currency. It will be 
strong and stable. ” - opening words to the European Community's Green Paper 
on the Practical Arrangements for the Introduction of the Single Currency, 1995
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The European Union has been the most ambitious and most successful at­
tempt at regional integration of the past half century, with respect to both the 
depth of integration and to its magnitude. Integration in Europe has been a gra­
dual process, from the formation of a customs union between a group of core 
countries to the current monetary union that encompasses almost all of Western 
Europe. The accession of many Eastern European countries is now the next step 
on the agenda.
The debate over monetary integration in Europe has been a heated one, and 
academics and policymakers still disagree over the viability or desirability of a 
common European currency. Even now that the euro is a reality the debate conti­
nues. What however cannot be disputed is that the integration process in Europe 
has been extremely successful, both from an economic and political point of view. 
There have been glitches along the way and issues that still need to be resolved, 
but mostly the consensus is that benefits have greatly outweighed the costs.
How does the EU fit into the literature on optimum currency areas and credi­
bility? It is important to note that most of the literature on this topic was develo­
ped expressedly to deal with the issue o f integration in Europe.
Firstly, it is interesting to note that there is not even consensus over whether 
or not Europe satisfies the criteria for constituting an optimum currency area. 
Those that maintain the answer is no take a very strict view of the conditions, and 
tend to compare Europe with the US, considering only the latter a true optimum 
currency area. On the other hand, Europe is the regional area that comes clo­
sest to satisfying the criteria, and it is probably safe to say that a strict adherence 
to all criteria would in fact be impossible outside of actual nation states.
For fixed rates to be economically efficient between a group of countries it is 
important that the vulnerability to external shocks be minimized. The effect of 
asymmetric shocks is in general smaller the greater the amount of intra versus 
inter industry trade, in other words the less trade is based on comparative advan­
tage and the more sim ilar are the countries industrial structures. Given an asym ­
metric shock to the region, we have seen there are three ways an optimal currency 
area can successfully respond. Let us examine the conditions one by one:
1) Factor mobility: Both capital and labor are institutionally free across the Euro­
pean Union. It is true that labor markets in Europe are particularly rigid and in 
general cultural and language issues limit labor mobility to some extent. But 
in general, the factor mobility promised by the European Single Market has 
greatly been achieved.
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2) Price and wage flexib ility :Wage flexibility in Europe is constrained by the 
extensive rigidities in the labor market and the large size of the welfare state.
3) Existence of a supernational mechanism for fiscal redistribution: While the 
European Union has a common budget, most of it is absorbed by the Com ­
mon Agriculture Policy and there is little political enthusiasm across Europe 
for a bigger EU budget to allow for bigger transfers.
With respect to the vulnerability of Europe to asymmetric shocks, the verdict 
isn’t clear cut. On the one hand, much of European trade is intraindustry, i.e. 
trade of similar products within the same industry, which tends to harmonize Eu­
ropean reaction to external demand shocks. On the other hand, over the last 10 
years Europe has be hit by unexpected historical events of a clearly asymmetric 
nature, such as the unification of Germany and the collapse of trade between 
Finland and the form er Soviet Union. These however are one time events, and 
while traumatic not likely to repeat themselves.
Many critics of European integration compare Europe with the US. The two 
regions in fact share a sim ilar geographic size and population. How does the 
U.S. compare as an optimum currency area? Different regions within the U.S. 
appear as susceptible to asymmetric shocks as different regions within the EU, 
consider for example, the oil crisis in Texas in the mid-80s and the property m ar­
ket collapse in New England in the late 80s. However labor is notoriously much 
more mobile in the US than in Europe, and labor market notably more flexible. 
Furthermore, the federal government plays a strong stabilizing role in the face of 
region specific shocks.
But a closer examination of the US case may disqualify it as well as an opti­
mum currency area. Critics maintain that labor mobility and flexibility may be 
exaggerated, as may federal outlays to compensate losses by state govern­
ments. However, the role of the dollar as the unified currency has most likely 
played a decisive role in US integration. So it may be argued that the euro may 
do the same for Europe.
It is interesting to note that Mundell himself, the father of optimum currency 
areas, has always been a strong proponent of European unification. Notw iths­
tanding his earlier writings, Mundell maintains that if a common currency can be 
managed so that its general purchasing power remains stable, then a common 
currency area, even if it encompasses diverse regions or is subject to asym m e­
tric shocks, is not only viable but desirable. Furthermore, the larger the area the 
better. A  common currency can mitigate the effect of asymm etric shocks by bet­
ter reserve pooling and portfolio diversification. With a common currency, a coun­
try suffering from an adverse shock can better share the loss with its partner
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because both countries hold claims on each other’s output in the common cu­
rrency. W ithout the common currency, the country hit by the shock will be forced 
to devalue and will find that its assets buy less on world markets, keeping the 
cost of the shock isolated in the country where it originated and lengthening the 
adjustment process.
The opinion that a common currency for Europe has been a m istake from an 
economic point of view cannot be so easily dismissed. It may in fact be true that 
Europe is too large, too diverse and too poorly integrated to fully benefit from 
monetary unification. On the other hand, a common currency could help overco­
me these obstacles. Furthermore, given that political integration is the final objec­
tive for Europeans, a unified currency is w ithout doubt a necessary condition, and 
economic efficiency is only part of the argument. In any case, Europe remains a 
benchmark case for all other countries looking to achieve regional integration.
As for the role of credibility, many observers worried that the new European 
Central Bank would not share the same reputation o f the German Bundesbank. 
Moreover, the Maastricht criteria were largely criticized for having no relevance in 
making Europe more of a optimum currency area. On the other hand, the Maas­
tricht criteria may have done much to enhance the credibility of the ECB, and 
therefore o f the monetary union as a whole. In fact the stringency o f the criteria 
may have been such to pressure countries to “shape up” so as to be able to par­
ticipate in the Euro, or else face a much greater loss in credibility. In this sense, 
the Maastricht criteria may have done much to develop what has been called a 
“culture of stability” in the region, helping to lay the ground for the success of 
monetary unification.
d. S om e econom ic ev idence fo r Latin  A m erica
Evidently designing a policy that will lead to a custom 's union and that will 
perhaps lead to an integration as symbolic as a monetary one is not a policy that 
can be adopted easily, thoughtlessly, nor can it be implemented overnight. It is a 
lengthy process. But we are beginning to follow that path.- Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, at the opening ceremony of the Sixth Economic Summit of Mercosur, 
2000 .
The discussion over the possibility of monetary integration in Latin America 
has in the past focused largely on the countries of Mercosur. The European mo­
del examined above doesn’t fit Mercosur. In fact, no European country dominates 
the EU as does Brazil in Mercosur. Nor does the NAFTA model apply, as Brazil’s 
regional domination is nowhere near that of the US. If one takes the position that 
Europe does not sufficiently satisfy the conditions of an optimal currency area, a
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fortiori Mercosur does not. It is generally believed that the main obstacles to mo­
netary integration in Mercosur are rigidities in the labor market and weaknesses 
in the financial systems.
On the other hand, there are some strong arguments to monetary integration 
in Mercosur, and in Latin America in general. In the past, economic instability has 
be one of the main causes of the lack of investment in the region. Secondly, 
Mercosur at present still consists of a small number of member countries, so 
negotiations and coordination could potentially be easier, and not clouded by the 
political issues that have marred the process of European integration.
The literature on optimum currency areas tells us that trade liberalization can 
exist w ithout monetary integration, depending on member countries characteris­
tics. But the deeper integration, with more open domestic markets and more in­
tense inter-regional competition, the more disruptive will be exchange rate 
changes, and the greater the need for some degree of monetary integration.
A common currency for Mercosur is considered a possibility not for the near 
future, but perhaps something to be achieved in 15 years. Notwithstanding talk in 
the region of a “small Maastricht” , given recent criticism over the necessity of 
some of the Maastricht criteria European economists now agree that the prere­
quisites for a smoothly functioning monetary union are the following:
1) An independent central bank, insulated from the political business cycle;
2) W age and price flexibility;
3) A strong financial sector;
4) Barriers to exiting the monetary union.
How far are the Mercosur countries from satisfying these four key condi­
tions? Notwithstanding current troubles in Argentina and, to a lesser extent, in 
Brazil, the member countries seem have been going in the right direction, even 
though there is obviously much left to be done. They have accomplished much 
on the way to the creation of politically and economically independent central 
banks. Argentina has made progress in strengthening its banking system and 
tightening regulation, Brazil has recognized, if not implemented, the need of fiscal 
reform. The most critical areas remain those of labor market flexibility and finan­
cial strengthening and regulation.
The last condition, the creation of barriers to exit, brings us back to the ar­
gument that monetary union makes sense for Mercosur only if part o f a project of
78 Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura
deeper integration. Technically, a country can always leave the union, especially 
during the process leading up to its creation. For this reason monetary union 
should not stand alone as an objective in itself, but as an integral part of a inter­
connected set of economic and political agreements.
Ill: THE NEW (POST CRISIS) DEBATE
a. The Bipolar View
The 90s were rocked by a series of major international capital market crises: 
Mexico in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 
1998, and Argentina and Turkey in 2000. All of these crises in some way invol­
ved fixed or pegged exchange rates. This led to what became known as the “bi­
polar view” , a position strongly advocated by the IMF which can be summarized 
succinctly as follows: exchange rate regimes between hard pegs and floating are 
not sustainable. From the point of view of regional groups considering monetary 
integration, it means an all or nothing approach.
Recent history appears to have validated this theory. Among developed 
countries, half the countries (including the EU) have what can be defined as very 
hard pegs, and nearly half the countries float. The situation in developing coun­
tries is less clear cut. O f the 33 countries that the IMF defines as emerging m ar­
kets, 13 are described as independently floating. Of these, six (Indonesia, Korea, 
Thailand, Russia, Brazil and Mexico) became floaters after the crises of the 90s. 
Three more (Czech Republic, Nigeria, and Taiwan) have managed floats. On the 
other end of the spectrum, five countries have currency boards or other arran­
gements with no legal tender, which we can consider as very hard pegs: Argenti­
na, Ecuador, Greece, Bulgaria and Panama. Seven more have fixed pegs, and 
the remaining four have crawling bands.
While in the case of emerging markets the contrast between hard peggers 
and floaters isn’t as stark as for developed countries, comparing the present si­
tuation with that of a decade ago shows a move away from intermediate, soft 
peg, arrangements towards either greater fixity or grater flexibility. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995) highlight the fact that pegged exchange rates aren’t viable in the 
long run for any type of economy, not because of some technical infeasibility, but 
because ultimately competing government objectives will force monetary authori­
ties to renege the peg. In fact, most central banks have access to enough fo ­
reign exchange resources to defeat a speculative attack of any magnitude, but to 
do so would entail ignoring the detrimental effects of such a policy on the dom es­
tic economy. Furthermore, intermediate systems such as bands and target zones
Options for m onetary integration. 79
succeed only in postponing the day of reckoning on which the local currency 
comes under attack, but once that does happen the problems are the same as 
under a fixed rate.
Stanley Fischer (2001) has convincingly argued that the bipolar view may be 
extreme, and that the statement that only the two corner solutions are feasible 
should include a couple of caveats. In particular, the statement should be rephra­
sed to take into account the crucial role of international capital flows. Therefore, 
fo r coun tries  w ith libe ra lized  cap ita l m ovem ents, with respect to fixed exchange 
rates only very hard pegs are sustainable, while instead there are a wide variety 
of flexible rate arrangements that may be sustainable. For countries not yet open 
to international capital flows, the full gamut of exchange rate arrangements is 
possible.
The arrangements that are excluded as unsustainable are those where the 
country in question has globalized capital markets and the government has 
committed to defending a particular exchange rate, but has not made the institu­
tional commitment necessary to make such a commitment credible. Much dam a­
ge has been caused by collapses of pegged regimes that enjoyed credibility for 
some time: such credibility actually worsened the effects of abandoning the regi­
me. The belief in the stability of the exchange rate removes the need to hedge, 
making any crisis particularly harmful for banks, corporations and government 
finances. Insufficient regulation and supervision of the banking system exacer­
bates the problem.
The case against fixed exchange rates outside of very hard pegs depends 
greatly on the greater level of international capital mobility over recent years, a 
product both of liberalization and technological advances. The globalization of 
capital markets has had the effect of magnifying any weakness or inconsistency 
in a country ’s commitment to its exchange rate, leaving monetary authorities with 
little room for maneuver.
W hat does this imply for countries considering monetary integration? Much of 
the answer lies in the so-called “ impossible triad” : fixed exchange rates, capital 
mobility, and autonomous monetary policy. If the bipolar view implies that soft 
pegs aren ’t an option, even as a transitory measure, the countries o f the region 
must be willing to give up autonomy in the monetary policy, or else consider capi­
tal controls. This latter option is also to be considered transitory, if we assume 
that counties in the course of their development will want to achieve capital libe­
ralization and integrate themselves into the global capital marketplace. In any 
case it is generally believed that capital account liberalization should be prece­
ded by, or at the least coordinated with, stable and consistent m acroeconomic
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policies, and development of the necessary infrastructure for the efficient functio­
ning of domestic financial institutions and markets.
The credibility of fixed rates between a subset of countries can in principle be 
increased though bilateral or multilateral cooperation, a common argum ent in 
favor of monetary integration. The incentive problems of competing government 
objectives however continue to apply. Inter-regional coordination can spread the 
cost of any adjustment among members, although in practice the stronger coun­
tries may not be willing to sacrifice their domestic goals to salvage a weaker 
partner. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) note that while EMS committed members to 
unlimited intervention in defense of agreed parities, in fact Germany interpreted 
its obligations as intervention only up to a point that wouldn’t threaten its prime 
objective of low inflation. Lastly, one must remember that in a world of floating 
exchange rates there is a limit to how far a subset of countries can insulate 
themselves from the effects of exchange rate instability: even though they fix 
among themselves, or to a specific currency or basket of currency, they must 
ultimately float against the rest.
b. F e a r o f  floa ting
The normative implication of the bipolar view has been that countries should 
either choose very hard pegs or float freely, and that recent developments in 
international markets seem to prove the validity of the view. However Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000a and 2000b), among others, note that many countries that claim 
to have floating regimes in reality do not allow the currency to float freely, choo­
sing instead different types of intervention to affect it behavior. They label this 
behavior “fear of floating” . This implies on the one hand that the “hollowing out” 
o f exchange rate regimes we appear to be witnessing is deceptive, and further­
more that fixed exchange rates are still considered greatly appealing by many 
countries.
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) find that lack of credibility is the most common 
cause of fear of floating. Lack of credibility may be reflected in volatile interest 
rates, sovereign credit ratings, and an increase in liability dollarization which 
tends to limit the central bank’s ability to act as the econom y’s lender of last re­
sort. In emerging markets a large part of liabilities are in fact dollarized, this en­
tails increasing debt servicing difficulties in case of devaluations. Not only is 
credit market access adversely affected but so is trade, due to the fact that much 
invoicing is in dollars and hedging opportunities are more limited. Furthermore, 
the pass-though from exchange rate swings to inflation is far higher than in deve­
loped economies, implying that if monetary authorities have any type of inflation 
target they will tend to try to limit exchange rate swings.
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But if floating is so ineffective, why don’t these countries choose to fix their 
exchange rates? Imperfect credibility of pegging the domestic currency can lead 
to exchange rate crises and in any case renders financial intermediation very 
complex. For example, today not a single Latin American country is able to place 
a long-term debt denominated in its own currency: all long-term financial markets 
are either denominated in dollars or indexed. This produces for serious exchange 
rate m ismatches in the balance sheets of corporations and individuals, and ren­
ders the system more vulnerable to exchange rate shocks.
W hat does this imply from the point of view of monetary integration? If fear of 
floating is a symptom of lack of credibility, liability dollarization and vulnerability 
with respect to credit access, all these conditions must be considered in analy­
zing the desirability and the direction of monetary integration. Furthermore, it will 
make a difference whether one, some, or all of the countries contemplating inte­
gration suffer from fear of floating. If only one potential member country exhibits 
these weaknesses, tying itself to stronger member countries’ monetary policy 
m ight increase credibility and improve macroeconomic stability. But if too many, 
or all, of the members exhibit the same weakness, credibility will not arise from 
simply tying together their monetary policies. Credibility will have to rely on an 
outside currency anchor, such as (but not necessarily) the dollar, which is the 
subject of the next section.
c. D o lla riza tion
Dollarization is defined as a situation in which a country abandons its own 
currency and adopts another country’s currency (the dollar, or another hard cu­
rrency, such as the Euro) as a means of payment and as the unit of account. Full 
dollarization therefore implies the complete relinquishing of monetary and ex­
changer rate policy.
Dollarization has emerged as a possible solution to the exchange rate regime 
debate, especially in the case of Latin American countries, due to the fundam en­
tal changes in the economic environment in the last decade. Inflation has beco­
me less of a problem, while instead the degree and scale of capital mobility have 
increased sharply, raising the frequency and severity of currency crises. If in fact 
only hard pegs and free floats are viable exchange rate solutions, as maintained 
by the supporters of the bipolar view, and if in the case of emerging markets 
pegs are rarely credible and free floats often result in de fact soft pegging, dolla­
rization becomes a very attractive solution. This is especially true for countries 
characterized by what Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) call “original sin” , a 
situation in which the domestic currency does not support long-term domestic 
markets and is not acceptable as a denomination for foreign loans.
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Dollarization offers the following benefits3:
Most importantly, dollarization eliminates exchange rate risk. By elim inating 
the risk of sharp exchange rate adjustments, dollarization promotes more 
stable international capital markets.
The permanence of the dollarization solution increases credibility In the 
countries financial and monetary system. The increased level of confidence 
of international investors contributes to larger and more stable capital flows.
The elim ination of the risk of a currency crisis reduces the country’s risk pre­
mium and lowers spreads on international borrowing. The resulting decrease 
in interest rates entails lower fiscal costs of servicing the public debt and hig­
her levels of investment.
Dollarization promotes closer economic and financial integration with the U.S. 
and the global economy in general. This may contribute to convergence of in­
come levels between the dollarizing economy and more advanced nations.
Inflation will converge to international levels, and especially important issue 
for countries with a history of high inflation.
Dollarization, if perceived as not only the adoption of a foreign currency but 
also an irreversible institutional change, may establish a firm basis for a more 
sound financial sector. This would be an important contribution to strong and 
steady economic growth.
Many emerging markets are characterized by a high level of dollarization of 
financial assets and liabilities, making the banking system particularly vulne­
rable to exchange rate risk. Dollarization eliminates these currency m ism at­
ches in banks’ and firm s’ balance sheets, increasing the stability of the 
banking system.
Dollarization may bring about greater integration in financial markets. Cu­
rrency risk is a important source of vulnerability in financial systems, in parti­
cular in the presence of liability dollarization. Not only the elimination of this 
source of vulnerability could contribute to stronger markets, but dollarization 
would also render more difficult the imposition of capital controls, given that it
3 For an in d ep th  an a lys is , see  Berg, A n d re w  and E. B o re n sz te in  (2000).
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would be possible to convert all assets to dollars. In this way it becomes mo­
re difficult to insolate the domestic financial market from the rest of the world.
As appealing as the prospect of dollarization might be, especially for em er­
ging market economies plagued by repeated currency crises and high inflation, 
there are some caveats to be considered.
Dollarization implies giving up the ability to use monetary and exchange rate 
policy to respond to adverse shocks. This is a strong tool to relinquish, 
however, as we have seen previously, floating exchange rates in emerging 
markets do not always respond as in textbook models. For these countries 
that are already reluctant to float, as is the case for many Latin American 
countries, dollarization does not necessarily imply giving up a valuable asset.
E5y dollarizing and giving up the use of monetary policy, the country is subject 
to monetary policy in the U.S., which responds to U.S. needs which do not 
necessarily coincide with the most appropriate response to the domestic 
econom ic situation.
Dollarization implies the loss of seigniorage, the profits accruing to the m one­
tary authorities from its right to issue currency. The seigniorage loss will have 
two components: a “stock” cost, deriving for monetary authorities “repurcha­
sing” the stock of domestic currency held by the public, and a “flow” cost, the 
loss of future seigniorage earnings that would have stemmed from new cu­
rrency printings in following years. Seigniorage lost by domestic monetary 
authorities is instead appropriated by the U.S. One way to solve this is 
through some sort of monetary association treaty with the U.S. that would 
imply sharing seigniorage revenues with the dollarized nation. Although this 
has not yet been done, there is a precedent to this: South Africa has a mone­
tary arrangement in this respect with the three other countries (Lesotho, Na­
mibia and Swaziland) that use the rand. U.S. Congress so far has not 
rejected the possibility of some type of arrangement with Latin American 
countries wishing to adopt the dollar as legal tender.
With dollarization monetary authorities give up, to some extent, the role of 
lender of last resort. While monetary authorities maintain the ability to inject 
short term liquidity into the system  or provide assistance to individual (small) 
banks in distress, authorities lose some ability to respond to a system-wide 
bank crisis. In fact, although with dollarization the central bank continues to 
maintain reserves to face smaller crisis and still has the ability to move liqui­
dity from stronger banks to weaker ones in the event o f a disturbance, it is u l­
timately the ability to print money as needed that allows the central bank to 
guarantee “beyond any doubt” that a ll claims be fully met under any circum s­
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tances. On the other hand, dollarization makes bank runs less likely, firstly by 
increasing confidence in the domestic financial system. Secondly, dollariza­
tion most likely would cause an increase in the presence of large and solid 
foreign banks, which not only would further increase confidence in the sys­
tem but could also provide support to the central bank if needed. Furtherm o­
re, dollarization could be accompanied by measures to strengthen the 
banking system and reduce the risk of bank runs, such as higher liquidity re­
quirements for banks.
With dollarization monetary authorities give up the ability to use inflation to 
default on the reai value of nominal commitments. In cases of unsustainable 
fiscal or financial problems, a massive depreciation/inflation can wipe out the 
real value of nominal liabilities, bringing obligations in line with available re­
sources. Real savings and real earnings of the private sector are expropria­
ted de facto  to bail out corporate and government borrowers. But this is an 
“option of last resort” , to be used only in crisis situations and increasingly 
costly, as economic agents incorporate expectations into existing contracts. It 
can be argued that dollarization may help prevent these crises, reducing the 
need to use such policies.
It is generally acknowledged that while dollarization may reduce the occu­
rrence and magnitude of some economic problems, dollarization will be most 
effective if accompanied by a series of policy reforms directed to strengthening 
and stabilizing the economic structure of the country. Specifically, a reform pro­
gram should be devised to ensure fiscal sustainability, financial sector solvency 
and liquidity and labor market flexibility.
IV. THE ANDEAN CASE
The Andean countries currently present a wide array of exchange rate regi­
mes, ranging from a float in Colombia and Peru, to a crawling peg in Bolivia, an 
exchange rate band in Venezuela, and at the other extreme dollarization in 
Ecuador. Is continued and possibly deeper integration within the region feasible 
in the context of such diverse exchange rate regimes? If we accept the desirabili­
ty of deeper Andean integration, and with it some form of monetary integration, 
the question becomes what form is most appropriate and most feasible. The first 
question we can attempt to answer is how close the Andean Community comes 
to being an optimum currency area. Given that consensus does not exist over 
whether Europe is an optimum currency area or not, we can exclude a priori that 
the Andean countries fulfill the requirements. Nonetheless, it is useful to see how 
well the Andean countries stand up to the criteria.
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a. O ptim um  cu rrency  area
The first matter to be examined is the variability of exchange rates within the 
region: theory tells us that the more variable real exchange rates, the stronger 
the case for exchange rate flexibility, and the less advantageous the formation of 
a common currency area. This is particularly true for regions where prices and 
wages are slow to adjust. The second issue is the vulnerability of the countries to 
asymm etric shocks, as we have seen the more susceptible are the member 
countries to different types of shocks the greater the costs of monetary integra­
tion. To measure this we first look at the correlation of GDP growth rates and per 
capita GDP across the region. Furthermore, we look at the importance of trade 
for each country, and at the commercial links between each pair of countries. 
The greater the amount of trade in general and between partners in particular, 
the lower the costs of integration. We also consider the dissim ilarity of the com ­
position of trade, in fact countries with very different export structures will be af­
fected differently by exogenous shocks. Lastly, we consider the degree of 
flexibility of labor markets across the region.
Real exchange rates
Using monthly exchange rates and consumer prices indices (CPIs), real bila­
teral exchange rates are constructed for the period 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. 
Table 1 reports minimum and maximum values, and standard deviations. One 
notes that not only Is volatility (proxied by standard deviations) large across the 
region, in general there does not appear to be a trend towards lower volatility: in 
fact in only four cases has volatility decreased between the two time periods, and 
minimally at that. The effect is particularly stark if we compare it to the situation in 
Europe before the first experience with monetary integration, i.e. the European 
m onetary System (Table 2).
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Regional Real Exchange rates 
1990.1-1995.12, 1990.1=100
M inim um M axim um S tandard  D evia tion
Bolivia/Colombia 93.9 152.74 20.35
Bolivia/Ecuador 100 145.89 16.53
Bolivia/Peru 98.12 245.00 20.01
Bolivia/Venezuela 100 181.93 17.56
Colombia/Ecuador 93.29 123.67 7.62
Colombia/Peru 96.52 234.53 24.05
Colombia/Venezuela 71.2 134.84 12.38
Ecuador/Peru 93.72 229.03 22.08
Ecuador/Venezuela 69.79 136.56 10.29
Peru/Venezuela 43.36 125.69 13.90
1995.1-2000.12, 1990.1=100
M inim um M axim um S tandard  D ev ia tion
Bolivia/Colombia 119.60 162.93 11.52
Bolivia/Ecuador 64.5 133.05 21.48
Bolivia/Peru 118.34 150.72 9.00
Bolivia/Venezuela 103.46 232.16 35.94
Colombia/Ecuador 49.96 101.82 11.92
Colombia/Peru 80.91 107.80 6.78
Colombia/Venezuela 73.95 186.34 33.77
Ecuador/Peru 97.21 189.40 19.85
Ecuador/Venezuela 77.85 335.06 63.43
Peru/Venezuela 71.72 179.09 34.51
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Table 2. Summary Statistics for European Real Exchange Rates
Other EC countries against Germany
1971.1-1979.12, 1971.1=100
M inim um M axim um S tandard  D evia tion
Belgium/Germany 91.66 112 5.41
France/Germany 96.17 123.29 5.13
Greece/Germany 100.05 151.83 8.97
Italy /Germany 99.63 148.4 13.24
Netherlands/Germany 87.08 107.06 4.71
Portugal/Germany 81.82 120.67 9.57
Spain/Germany 80.94 116.93 7.43
U.K./Germany 98.25 146.93 11.89
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
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Output
With respect to business cycle variability, volatility and correlation across the 
Andean countries is not comparable to that of European countries for a number 
of reasons. While the amplitude of fluctuations across industrial countries has 
been declining over time, in particular due to the stability of the U.S. economy 
over the 90s, volatility in developing countries has been increasing due to a se­
ries of crises in emerging markets. Latin America was affected not only by the 
crises in Mexico and Brazil, but fuel exporters were also affected by volatility in 
oil prices. Lower correlation of output across developing countries with respect to 
industrial nations is also a result of greater diversity in terms of production and 
institutional structure and greater vulnerability to external and domestic shocks.
Output is measured as annualized quarterly real GDP growth rates from 
1991 io 2000, except for Venezuela where quarterly data is only available from 
1993. The U.S. is included, as the most important trading partner of all Andean 
countries. Means and standard deviations are included to show a measure of 
volatility.
Table 3. Correlation of GDP growth in Andean Community, 
1991-2000 quarterly
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela US Mean Standarddeviation
Bolivia 1 4.03 2.39
Colombia 0.43 1 2.78 3.52
Ecuador 0.34 0.68 1 1.47 3.67
Peru 0.12 0.52 0.47 1 4.44 5.16
Venezuela 0.18 0.62 0.45 0.18 1 1.09 5.25
US -0.21 -0.45 -0.40 -0.17 -0.21 1 3.69 0.91
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Solivia), Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (Colombia), Central Bank of Venezuela.
Table 3 shows that the strongest correlations exist between Colombia, Ecua­
dor and Venezuela, while instead correlations of Bolivia and Peru are relatively 
smaller. This may indicate that greater sim ilarity of shocks across Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela (which in fact are all largely dependent on oil exports). 
Not surprisingly, output volatility is relatively high across the region. Correlation 
with the US is much smaller, and in any case negative. This is consistent with the 
declining rate of developing countries’ and in particular Latin Am erica ’s correla­
tion with industrial country output. Comparing this to a sample of European coun­
tries, where monetary integration has already taken place, we find -  not 
surprisingly - that in general the degree of correlation is higher.
Table 4. Correlation of GDP growth in Europe, 1991-2000 quarterly
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Austria Belgium France Finland Germany Italy Portugal Mean Standarddeviation
Austria 1 2.07 1.67
Belgium 0.63 1 2.14 2.10
France 0.76 0.77 1 1.89 1.67
Finland 0.40 0.56 0.58 1 3.01 3.35
Germany 0.56 0.83 0.75 0.31 1 1.52 1.30
Italy 0.62 0.84 0.75 0.63 0.71 1 1.54 1.38
Portugal 0.55 0.61 0.70 0.50 0.49 0.56 1 2.92 2.37
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Another useful measure of the possibility of monetary integration is similarity, 
of income levels. Table 5 shows the income level in the Andean countries m ea­
sured by purchasing power corrected GDP per capita. An even income distribu­
tion across the region is important not only because it contributes to econom ic 
behavior becoming more similar (less asymmetric shocks), but also because it 
increases the probability of macroeconomic coordination. An unequal income 
distribution will lead to divergences, especially in fiscal policy. Furthermore, ex­
treme differences in income distribution could be a political barrier to the free 
movement of labor across the region for fear of large migrations.
Table 5. Purchasing power corrected GDP per capita, US$
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
Andean
Community
1975 n.a. 1993 1075 1926 2891 1971
1985 n.a. 3938 2105 2838 3879 3190
1998 2269 6006 3003 4282 5808 4274
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Trade structure
The more open an economy is, the less effective is the nominal exchange ra­
te as a policy tool, and therefore the easier it is to enter a monetary union. In 
particular, the greater the amount of trade between partner countries, the greater 
the benefits of forming a monetary union. In fact, not only would exchange rate 
policy be ineffective in offsetting shocks in the region, but also there is more to 
gain in terms of reducing transaction costs.
Table 6. Openness: trade as share of GDP (%) in Andean Community, 2000
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1980-90 1991-2000 2000
Bolivia 44.9% 48.7% 46.2%
Colombia 28.9% 36.4% 43.4%
Ecuador 50.3% 58.7% 73.2%
Peru 33.4% 30.5% 33.8%
Venezuela 49.7% 50.2% 46.4%
S ource : In te rn a tio n a l F ina n c ia l S ta tis tics , IMF.
While Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela have displayed largely constant degrees 
of openness over the last 20 years, Colombia and Ecuador have increased 
openness notably. Furthermore, degrees of openness are not dissim ilar from 
those of many European countries:
Table 7. Trade as share of GDP (%) in Europe, 1998
1980-90 1991-98 1998
France 43.8% 44.1% 49.6%
Germany 58.9% 50.3% 56.0%
Italy 42.1% 44.4% 49.4%
Spain 39.3% 46.2% 5 6.8%
Greece 49.2% 43.6% 48.7%
S ou rce : In te rn a tio n a l F ina n c ia l S ta tis tics , IMF.
A second important index is the amount of intraregional trade, i.e. trade w it­
hin the region. In fact the larger the scale of intra-region trade, the less effective 
the nominal exchange rate as a tool in the face of asymmetric regional shocks.
Table 8. Intra-region trade in Andean community (%), 2000
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
Andean
Community
Only Exports 25% 17% 14% 6% 5% 9%
Only Imports 8% 13% 21% 14% 11% 12%
T ota l Trade 16% 14% 18% 11% 7% 11%
S ource : A n d e a n  C o m m u n ity .
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Figure 2. Andean intra-regional trade 1990-2000
- f r - Bolivia —ö— Colombia —A—Ecuador 
—o—Peru Venezuela
Andean intra-regional trade has increased over the last decade, although it 
registered a marked decreased in 1999 due to economic contraction and decrea­
sed demand in the region. Andean intra-regional trade recovered somewhat in 
2000, reaching 11%. However, these numbers are a far cry from those of Euro­
pe, whose intra-regional trade represents almost 70% of total trade, or of Merco­
sur, where intra-regional trade accounts for approximately 20%.4
It is interesting to note that for all Andean countries the United States conti­
nues to be the most important trading partner, representing 37% of Andean trade 
in 1999. This makes the region particularly vulnerable to demand shocks in the 
U.S.
Countries with a more similar production structure are better candidates for 
monetary integration because they will be affected more similarly by sector speci­
fic shocks. An examination of the structure of exports across the Andean coun­
tries reveals similarities but also notable differences. All countries continue to be 
strongly dependent on traditional primary exports. Petroleum is an important
4 In te rn a tio n a l T ra d e  S ta tis tic s  2000, W TO .
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Andean export, the main producers being Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia. 
Petroleum however represents the bulk of Venezuelan exports (79%), while 
substantially less in Colombia (31%) and in Ecuador (33%). Mining represents 
the main export sector in Bolivia (35%) and Peru (55%). Agriculture is important 
in all m ember countries except Venezuela, although specialization varies across 
countries: in Bolivia soybeans represent 15% of exports, in Colombia coffee re­
presents 8%, and fishing represents 15 and 24% respectively in Ecuador and 
Peru Colombia and Ecuador exhibit a more diversified source of export earnings 
than their partners within the Andean Community.
Table 9. Export composition, 2000 (% of total merchandise exports)
P rim ary
ag ricu ltu ra l
goods
Food p roducts Fue l
O res and  
m eta ls
M anu fac tu red
goods
Bolivia 3.2 30.2 13.0 24.6 28.9
Colombia 4.7 19.1 41.4 0.7 34.1
Peru 3.0 30.3 7.1 39.3 20.3
Ecuador 4.0 36.5 49.4 0.2 9.9
Venezuela, RB 0.2 1.5 86.1 3.0 9.1
F uen te : B anco  M und ia l.
This diversified industrial structure renders some members especially vulner­
able to international oil price movements, and all members are vulnerable to 
movements in international commodity prices, which are tend to be correlated 
imperfectly across agriculture, fishing and minerals. Insufficient diversification of 
domestic industrial structures also increases vulnerability, in particular in Bolivia, 
Peru and Venezuela. This is in net contrast to the European situation, where 
manufactures represent the majority of exports for all members. Not only does 
this entail greater likelihood o f countries being affected by sim ilar sectoral 
shocks, but manufactures are also less susceptible to the type of international 
price fluctuations that historically plague commodities.
Labor market flexibility
The theory tells us that the more mobile factors of production within a region, 
the more likely the region is, ceteris p a rib u s , to constitute an optimum currency 
area. In fact, intraregional labor mobility can alleviate the adjustment process in 
the face of an asymmetric shock. Direct evidence on inter-regional labor mobility 
is difficult to obtain, but since labor mobility is directly related to labor market 
flexibility, we can use an index of employment protection as a proxy of rigidity in
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regional labor markets. Furthermore, labor market flexibility is tied to wage flexib i­
lity, another important OCA criterion.
The employment protection index shown below, drawn from Marquez and 
Pages (1998), uses institutional data from 1990 to summarize information on the 
following: length of probation and advance notice periods, the actual cost of d is­
missing a worker, measures of definition of just-cause for dismissal, tenure- 
related severance payments, and reinstatement. Figure 3 shows that the Andean 
countries exhibit high levels of labor protection, even when compared to the noto­
riously “rigid” European nations. In fact, they exhibit the highest levels of em ­
ployment protection in the sample. However it should be noted that the index 
does not take into account institutional reforms since 1990, ad gives merely an 
ordinal, not a cardinal, measure.
Figure 3. Employment protection index
Heckman and Pages (2000) instead construct an cardinal measure of job se­
curity, based on a common set of dismissal probabilities across countries. This 
shows once again the relative rigidity of Andean labor markets, which appear in
Options for monetary integration. 93
fact es the most rigid in Latin America. However there has been a tendency to­
wards a reduction in such rigidity, in particular in Colombia and Venezuela, and 
to a lesser extent in Peru.
It appears the Andean countries don’t satisfy some of the OCA criteria. On 
the other hand, as we have seen, no group of countries has in fact fulfilled such 
criteria in a satisfactory manner, not even those of the European Union. Further­
more, the Andean Community does not always perform worse that the EU. 
Comparing characteristics of the Andean Community with those of European 
countries can give some indication of how prepared Andean countries are for 
monetary integration, but one should be careful in drawing conclusions. Firstly, 
there is evidence that the OCA criteria are endogenous, in the sense that mone­
tary integration itself can create and strengthen the very conditions necessary for 
its own success. Furthermore, as we have seen in the first part of this paper, the 
economic argum ents for monetary integration have shifted over time. While the 
OCA criteria can highlight certain advantages and disadvantages of adopting a 
common currency, especially for emerging economies the arguments of financial 
stability and external creditworthiness become increasingly important, possibly 
discounting any disadvantage suggested by the OCA theory. It is to these argu­
ments that we know turn.
b. The trad itiona l c red ib ility  a rgum ent
Part of the traditional credibility argument for monetary integration is that the 
latter allows weaker members to free ride of the greater policy credibility of their 
stronger partners. This argument, while important in the European Union, is less 
relevant in the Andean Community where no country sticks out as a paragon of 
strong monetary policy. No central bank would naturally take the lead in the for­
mation of a common Andean currency, and it is quite likely that any new Andean 
currency would suffer from even greater credibility problems.
A second traditional argument, more relevant to the Andean region, is that in­
tegration in general (not only monetary) can serve the purpose of locking-in re­
form domestically. Very often in emerging markets reforms fail because 
governments lack credibility. While one tends to think of regional trade areas as a 
mechanism to commit to free trade, there are cases of regional agreements in­
cluding a comm itment to democracy or a commitment to other economic policy 
reforms, as in the case of Mexico in NAFTA. Monetary integration can work as 
yet another comm itment tool within a regional agreement.
As is the case for any type of commitment mechanism, success depends on 
the value of belonging to the arrangement and the cost of defecting. In the case
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of monetary integration, the cost of defection depends in part on the form of inte­
gration: it will be much more costly to defect from a common currency than from 
a system of intra-region fixed exchange rates (as the European case has shown). 
Within the Andean region, commitment to monetary integration could help bring 
about necessary economic policy reforms by eliminating time inconsistency is­
sues for monetary authorities.
The credibility argument becomes much stronger if the common currency 
considered is the US dollar. Dollarization avoids the need to create complex in- 
traregional institutions, such as a regional central bank. Furthermore, by eliminating 
exchange rate risk it immediately increases credibility, potentially increasing the 
level of confidence of international investors, contributing to larger and more stable 
capital flows, and ultimately leading to increased growth and welfare in the region.
c. F e a r o f floa ting  and  do lla riza tion
As noted repeatedly above, we cannot discuss monetary integration within 
Latin America without examining fear of floating and the degree of dollarization in 
the Andean countries. To measure the extent of fear of floating, Hausmann, Pa- 
nizza and Stein (2000) use an index based on the ratio between international 
reserves and M2, as shown in Figure 4. Monthly data from January 1997 to April 
1999 is used in most cases.
Countries with a high index appear to be “floating with a life jacke t” , i.e. ex­
hibit fear of floating by maintaining high levels of reserves to offset exchange rate 
pressures. Countries that exhibit fear of floating are not in fact taking advantage of 
their monetary policy independence, therefore diminishing their costs of entering a 
monetary union. Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) also examine the volatility 
of the depreciation rate over the volatility of reserves and over the volatility of in­
terest rates respectively, to see what tools are being used to defend the exchange 
rate. All three measures show strong fear of floating for Andean countries.5
5 Colombia adopted inflation targeting at the end of 2000 and Peru is moving in that di­
rection. It is too early to see the effects of such shift of policy on fear of floating indica­
tors, but the expectation is that such a change in policy will imply more free floating in 
these countries.
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Figure 4. Fear of floating: international reserves over M2
Source: Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) and IFS.
As for the degree o f dollarization of the economy, there are various measu­
res, the most easiest being the share of dollar deposits in the country over total 
deposits. Colombia and Venezuela do not allow citizens to hold foreign currency 
deposits, but both Bolivia and Peru exhibit a high degree of dollarization accor­
ding to this index: 92.6% and 90.6% in 2000, respectively. Ecuador’s index befo­
re dollarizing was actually quite low.
Another way of seeing the degree of dollarization of an economy is to consi­
der the ratio of M2 to GDP within an economy, countries that exhibit low ratios 
may be making strong use of other currencies.
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Table 10. Degree of dollarization: M2/GDP (2000) 6
A ndean O ther em erg ing
Bolivia 51% Indonesia 57%
Colombia 33% Philippines 63%
E cu ad o r(1998) 28% South Korea 80%
Peru 33% Singapore 107%
Venezuela 18% Thailand 106%
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
As expected, the Andean countries appear strongly dollarized, in particular if 
compared to other emerging markets.
d. W hat op tions fo r A ndean m one ta ry  in teg ra tion?
The options open to the Andean Community are basically three:
1) Some form of mutual exchange rate pegging;
2) The creation of a common regional currency;
3) Dollarization.
1) Mutual exchange rate pegging
This type of arrangement entails that member countries commit to limit fluc­
tuations of bilateral exchange rates to within agreed bands around prescribed 
central parities. An example of this arrangement was the Exchange Rate Mecha­
nism (ERM) in the European Monetary System. The arrangement would also 
entail some sort of understanding regarding mutual support between central 
banks, appropriate policy reactions when band limits are reached, and a m echa­
nism for regional consultation on the adjustments of central parities when nee­
ded. Furthermore, coordination of monetary and exchange rate policies is key.
Within Europe the ERM system did work successfully for time, and exchange 
rates in Europe stabilized. However, for the time being the Andean Community
6 Where M2 series were not available, it was defined as the sum of Money and Quasi 
Money. For Bolivia we use the measure M3/GDP.
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appears to lack the institutional structure and the political consensus needed to 
develop and implement formal arrangements for macroeconomic policy coordina­
tion. Furthermore, the limited credibility of such arrangements seems to limit their 
possibility of success. However, such a system may work as a temporary arran­
gement in a move towards a common regional currency.
2) A common regional currency
The evidence on fear o f floating seems to point to the fact that the Andean 
countries that aren’t already committed to some for of fixed regime, be it dollari­
zation in Ecuador or a crawling peg in Bolivia, exhibit fear of floating. If this is 
true, they do not appear to be taking advantage o f the free use o f their monetary 
policies, which instead are dedicated to defending the exchange rate.
While a common currency might give greater credibility to Andean monetary 
policy, it would not help ensure greater stability with respect to external currency 
fluctuations. Furthermore, one must not neglect the fact that creating the necessa­
ry regional institutions to support a common regional currency is a difficult task at 
best. In fact, it should be noted that existing common currency areas initially deve­
loped through member countries pegging their currency to a stronger central cu­
rrency: the deutsche mark in Europe and the French franc in the CFA franc zone.
Although the institutions and the political will for a common currency do not 
exist at the moment, as integration evolves in the region this may develop. In 
particular, the prerequisites for a move towards a common Andean currency are 
a greater political commitment to deeper integration, the w illingness to give up 
monetary sovereignty in favor of supernational mechanisms, and macroeconomic 
coordination in matters of fiscal and financial discipline.
3) Dollarization
Dollarization would in effect imply the formation of an OCA between all the 
Andean countries and the US. From the point of view of the OCA criteria, this 
would be even less indicated than a common Andean currency. However, we 
have seen that there are many benefits to be obtained through dollarization that 
are not considered in the OCA literature. Furthermore, the OCA theory does not 
take in account the significant growth of capital flows to the region in the last 
decades, and with it the increased importance of exchange rate risk. The high 
level of implicit dollarization detected in the Andean countries, and in Latin Am e­
rica in general, make the domestic banking systems particularly vulnerable to this
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risk. One of the greatest benefits of dollarization is the immediate elim ination of 
exchange rate risk.
As seen in previous sections, there are however negative points that must 
not be overlooked. Furthermore, the present crisis in Argentina shows that dolla­
rization is not the panacea that many proponents had hoped.
A word about inflation targeting
In recent years inflation targeting, first considered an option only for industria­
lized economies, has increasingly been embraced by emerging market countries. 
Successes in such countries as Chile have strengthened this trend in Latin Am e­
rica. Amongst the Andean countries Colombia has recently adopted the strategy, 
Peru apparently will soon follow. At present inflation targeting is being proposed 
as a part of a possible solution to Argentina’s crisis.7 While many countries regu­
larly pre-announce inflation targets and at the same time adhere to other moneta­
ry or exchange rate targets, full-fledged inflation targeting implies a commitment 
to subordinating other policy objectives to the inflation target. Countries that prac­
tice inflation targeting in most cases have a floating exchange rate regime, given 
that inevitably conflicts will develop between the inflation target and defense of 
the exchange rate. While inflation targeting at present appears a promising op­
tion for many developing countries, these countries usually exhibit specific pro­
blems that make such a policy more difficult to implement. If inflation targeting is 
indeed successful in Colombia and Peru, it will be important to consider the im­
plications for Andean monetary integration.
V. OPTIONS FOR ANDEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION: SOME SIMPLE SIMULATIONS
This section presents some simple simulations done to see the possible ef­
fects o f three different exchange rate regimes: a free float, monetary integration 
and dollarization. Colombian data is used in the simulation, given that based on 
data seen above Colombia is the most representative country of the Andean 
Community, with the highest level of correlation with partners’ GDP growth rates 
and the highest level of intra-group trade. In the case of monetary integration we 
consider a common currency shared with Venezuela, given that most intra-group 
trade is between these two countries.
7 Ricardo Hausmann, “A plan B for Argentina” , paper prepared for LACEA annual meet­
ings, Montevideo October 2001.
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For simplification, only Colombia’s economy will be simulated, even in the 
case of monetary union. To consider a two country model would add an unne­
cessary level of complexity for the straightforward exercise done here. A more 
complete model would solve for both countries simultaneously in a general equi­
librium setup, I leave this for further research.8 Here we will take the Venezuelan 
economy as exogenous, and consider the effects o f the three different regimes.
OLS regression is used to estimate a very simple model for the Colombian 
economy over 1991-2000, which is then forecasted forward 5 years (20 quar­
ters).9 Annualised quarterly data is used. The basic estimated model is made up 
of a Phillips curve like equation for inflation, and an aggregate demand like curve 
for output gap. The model is completed by a covered interest rate parity equation 
to determ ine the exchange rate, and a monetary policy rule to represent the ex­
change rate regime. Regression analysis yields the following equations (t sta tis­
tics are in parenthesis).
Inflation = 0.97 * inflation (-1) + 0.3 * colom bc(-l)
(83.4) (3.0)
Colombo = 0.91 * colombc (-1) - 0.22 * venezbc (-3) - 0.09 * (int (-1) -  inflation (-1)) +
(10.6) (-3.9) (-2.9)
+ 13.4* rerdepr (-1)+0.02 * venezinflation (- 3)
(3.4) (2.6)
C olom bc  (venezbc ) is the quarterly annualised GDP growth rate for Colom ­
bia (Venezuela), detrended with a Hodrick Prescott filter. In fla tion  and venez in fla ­
tion  refer to the percentage change in the CPI in Colombia and Venezuela 
respectively. In t is the annual discount rate and rerdepr the real exchange rate.
8 There is an extensive empirical literature on monetary policy options in emerging 
economies, see for example Ghironi and Rebucci (2002) calibrate a general equilibrium 
model to the case of Argentina. For an example of monetary union simulation, see Be- 
nassy and Mojon (1998), who compare a floating regime to monetary union between two 
European economies. For empirical work on dollarization, see for example Edwards 
(2002) and Edwards and Magendzo (2001).
9 OLS has many weaknesses in modelling time series, but is often used to create simple 
models of a country’s economy.
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The monetary policy rules that represent the three regimes are as follows:
Free float: Interest rate determined by simple Taylor rule.
Int = spread + 1.5* (inflation-inflationtarget) + ,5*outputgap + riskpremium
W here outpu tgap  is the output gap in logs, measured as the difference be­
tween the log gdp and the trend (determined by Hodrick Prescott filtering). The 
r isk  p rem ium  is a measure of country risk according to Standard and Poor, and 
sp re a d  is the distance with respect to the Lombard rate. The inflation target are 
the actual targets set by the Colombian Central Bank.
Dollarization: Interest rate determined by US interest rate + a country risk 
premium.
Monetary union: Interest rate determined by a Taylor rule that takes into ac­
count averaged values of inflation and the output gap over the two countries 
(Venezuela and Colombia).
Int = spread + 1.5 * (.5 * (inflation-inflationtarget) + .5 * (venezinflation-15)) + 
,5*(.5* outputgap +.5* venoutputgap) + riskpremium
Also, exchange rate depreciation continues to be determined by covered in­
terest rate parity (since the union continues to float against the rest of the world). 
The common exchange rate regime is represented by identical interest rates in 
the two countries (which at most differ for the country risk premium).
I model the case of free floating with a Taylor rule as this is one of the most 
popular (and simplest) monetary policy rules, although its effectiveness in deve­
loping countries has been questioned.10 According to this rule, interest rates rise 
(decrease) when inflation and output rise (decrease) above their target levels. 
Monetary union is modeled as a more complex Taylor rule, that takes into ac­
count an average of the two countries inflation and output gaps.
To fo recast, one needs to assum e values fo r US in te res t rates, co u n try  risk  
prem ium , V enezuelan infla tion, the Venezuelan ou tpu t gap and  G D P  trend  
grow th  in Colom bia. The fo llow ing assum ptions are m ade:
10 A good discussion can be found in Taylor (2000).
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Annual growth rate in Colombia is 3.3% (Central bank estimate).
Risk premium is constant, spread decreases (follows trend).
US interest rate set at 3%.
US inflation is set at 2%.
Venezuelan business cycle movements follow those of the preceding five
year period.
Venezuelan inflation fixed at 12.
The results of the simulations are shown in table 11a. Average output growth 
was highest in the case of free float, lowest (mainly negative) for the case of dol­
larization. Output growth showed the highest variance in the case of dollarization. 
Looking instead at the output gap, dollarization gave rise to a large negative and 
increasing output gap. Free floating and monetary union gave much smaller out­
put gaps. The floating regime registered the lowest variance, dollarization the 
highest.
In all three simulation cases inflation continued it’s downwards trend, but was 
lowest in the case o f dollarization, highest in the case of monetary union. Vari­
ance was highest for dollarization, lowest in the case of monetary union.11
Table 11 a. Simulation results, with Venezuela inflation = 12%.
Free floa t D o lla riza tion M one ta ry  U nion
Output growth M ean 0.62 -3.50 0.24
St. D ev (2.11) (3.33) (2.08)
Output gap M ean -1.68 -8.60 -2.44
St. D ev (2.87) (9.01) (3.55)
Inflation M ean 3.20 -4.73 5.30
St. D ev (6.36) (12:58) (3.74)
All simulations are sensitive to changes in the Venezuelan economy, but the 
monetary union simulations are very sensitive in particular to changes In the va­
lues of Venezuelan inflation. The more similar the two economies of Colombia 
and Venezuela, i.e. the more similar their output gaps and their inflation levels, 
the more sim ilar will be the forecasts for the cases o f free floating and monetary
11 This is the only result that is not consistent with the literature.
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union. On the other hand, as Venezuelan inflation increases, so does average 
inflation in Colombia. Table 11b and 11c show simulation results with Venezue­
lan inflation equal to 30 and 40% respectively.
Table 11b. Simulation results, with Venezuela inflation = 30%.
Free float Dollarization Monetary Union
Output growth Mean 2.62 -2.14 1.94
St. Dev (1.66) (2.57) (2.60)
Output gap Mean -0.26 -6.80 -2.78
St. Dev (1.83) (6.99) 2.48)
Inflation Mean 5.05 -2.46 3.33
St. Dev (4.71) (10.38) (4.69)
Table 11c. Simulation results, with Venezuela inflation = 40%.
Free float Dollarization Monetary Union
Output growth Mean 2.15 -1.38 2.89
St. Dev (1.44) (2.17) (3.87)
Output gap Mean 0.52 . -5.80 -2.18
St. Dev (1.60) (5.87) (3.05)
Inflation Mean 6.07 -1.21 3.94
St. Dev (3.80) (9.17) (4.33)
The results of the simulation are mostly consistent with the literature. Dollari­
zation implies a trade off between low inflation and lower growth, which does not 
appear desirable for Colombia given the current downward trend of its inflation. 
The monetary union scenario tends to the free float one as the two economies 
converge. On the other hand, in the case of divergence of the two economies or 
asymm etric shocks, monetary union is less desirable, in as it increases volatility 
and destabilizes the economy. From these simple simulations, a flexible regime 
appears, for the time being, the best course of action for Colombia.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
W hile the theory on optimum currency areas has dominated much of the de­
bate on regional monetary integration, it is in general believed that there are 
other benefits to integration that are not considered within this framework. The 
literature on credibility has been a first step towards taking into account these 
considerations. Emerging economies however, and Latin America in particular, 
exhibit certain characteristics not found in industrialized economies, for which 
most of the monetary integration literature has been written. What little work has 
been done on the viability of monetary integration in emerging markets has been 
done within the OCA framework. What is needed is a new framework that takes
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into account not only issues such as vulnerability to asymmetric shocks but also 
the characteristics particular to these types o f economies, such as fear of floating 
and original sin. While applying the OCA criteria can give some prelim inary intui­
tion on the case for monetary integration within a group o f emerging economies, 
in the end any conclusion drawn would be incomplete without considering these 
other fundamental aspects.
With respect to comparisons with European monetary integration, there is an 
important caveat to be considered. While many regions tend to look to Europe as 
a guide for successful monetary integration, it is important to remember not only 
that integration in the region was a lengthy process spanning over 40 years, but 
also that the first attempts at monetary integration (the European monetary sys­
tem) w ere  done within a context of much more limited capital mobility than is 
currently the case. For Latin American countries in particular, the high degree of 
capital market liberalization increases notably the costs of giving up monetary 
policy, and exacerbates vulnerabilities through higher risks of international finan­
cial contagion.
For the Andean Community to most fully reap the benefits of integration it is 
important that a commitment be made towards deeper integration, beyond simple 
trade liberalization. And if deeper integration is to be successful, some form of 
monetary integration within the region is inevitable. Which form such integration 
should take will be object of policy debate in upcoming years.
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